1.3 Applications for these certificates were submitted to the Respondent by
the Ministry of Defence. At the time of submission of those applications the
Ministry of Defence were in the process of disposing of the former operational
airbase at RAF Manston. On 31 August 1999 the forn1er RAF Manston was purchased
by the Wiggins Group PLC.
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2.
Certificate TH/98/0400
2.1 The application for a certificate of lawful development No. TH/98/0400
related to the buildings at RAF Manston, Kent". It was submitted to the
Respondent on 11 May 1988. This application is included at bundle p.9 and a plan
identifying the buildings to which the application relates is identified on the
plan produced in exhibit ADB.3 to David Bruce's affirmation.
2.2 The application described the proposed development as:
"Use of buildings in Schedule 2 in association with use of airfield at
RAF Manston for civilian purposes"
2.3 The existing use of the buildings is described in the application as
follows: "As listed in Schedule 2 in association with the military usage of
the airfield at RAF Manston."
2.4 On 8 July 1999. the Respondent granted a certificate of lawful proposed
use pursuant to the application (B.45) The proposed use is described in the
First Schedule of the certificate as follows "Certificate of lawful
development for the proposed use of the existing airfield buildings listed in
the attached schedule in association with use of the airfield for civilian
purposes"
2.5 The reason for granting this certificate is stated in the certificate to
be as follows:
" In the opinion of the Local Planning Authority the change of ownership
of the land in question from Crown owned airport to civilian owned airport, does
not in itself [constitute] a material change of use of the land edged red. As
the land in question has been used for airport purposes for a period in excess
of 10 years, no specific planning permission is required, unless there occurs
some other material change in circumstances."
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3
CertificateTH/99/037
3.1 The application for certificate No.TH/99/0377 was submitted to the
Respondent on 28 April 1999, This application is included in the bundle at p.1-3
3.2 The application describes the proposed development as follows:
"Use of RAF Manston, including buildings, by commercial civilian
user."
3.3 The existing use of the land to which the application related is
described as follows:
"Military (and part commercial civilian) airfield with aircraft
movements and associated buildings."
3.4 On 8 July 1999, the Respondent granted a certificate of proposed lawful
use or development pursuant to the application (B,41 :) The proposed use or
development is described in the First Schedule of the certificate as follows:
"Certificate of lawful development in respect of the use of crown owned
airfield land and buildings for Commercial civilian use."
3.5 The reason for granting this certificate is stated in the certificate to
be as follows:
" In the opinion of the Local Planning Authority the change
of ownership of the land in question from Crown owned airport to civilian owned
airport, does not in it self [constitute] a material change of use of the land
edged red. As the land in question has been used for airport purposes for a
period in excess of 10 years, no specific planning permission is required,
unless there occurs some other material change in circumstances."
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4.
The Legal Basis of Certificates of Lawful Proposed Use or Development
4.1 Section 192 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (TCPA 1990) (as
amended)
4.2 A similar procedure is provided by s.191 TCPA 1990 for certificates of
lawful existing or development ( or CLEUDS). The procedure for submission and
grant of certificates pursuant to s.192 is provided by Town and Country Planning
(General Development Procedure) Order 1995 art.24.
DETR Circular 10/97 provides guidance from the Secretary of State for the
Environment, Transport and the Regions in respect of "Enforcing Panning
Control". Annex 8 to this Circular provides guidance in respect of the
determination and issue of certificates pursuant to ss. 191 and 192 TCPA 1990.
The guidance emphasises the importance of precision in identifying and
describing the lawful use or development in the certificate, Para. 8.28, in
respect of certificates of lawful proposed use or development, (CLOPUDs),
provide as follows:
"Subsection (3) of section 192 is the counterpart, for proposed uses or
operations, of section 191 (5). It provides that a LDC granted under section 192
shall specify the land to which it relates; describe the use or operations in
question (where appropriate, identifying a use by reference to the relevant
"use class"); give the reason why carrying out the proposal would be
lawful; and specifying the date of the application. Although this certificate
would not be the equivalent in law, to a grant of planning permission for
proposed development, it will indicate that unless any relevant factor has
changed since the application date specified in the certificate, it would be
lawful to proceed with the proposal. It is therefore vital to ensure that the
terms of the certificate are precise and there is no room for doubt about what
is lawful at a particular date "
(See also paras.8.16 -8.22 and in particular, para.8.21 which advises that
uses or development to which a certificate relates should be defined with
sufficient precision to avoid future unrestricted intensification.)
4.4 In Broxbourne Borough Council v SoSE [1980] QB the Divisional Court
considered the extend of an "established use certificate" Granted
under s.52 TCPA.. 1971 in the following terms:
"It is hereby certified that the use of the above land and buildings for
storage, sawing, re-sawing and disposal of timber in the round and the storage,
maintenance, repair overhaul of vehicles and plant incidental thereto, was on
October 3, 1972, established within the meaning of paragraph ( a) of section 94(
1 ) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971."
The issue for the determination of the Divisional Court was whether the
Secretary of State was correct in concluding that a certificate in the above
terms was sufficient to pemit, without an express grant of planning permission,
the intensive use of thc relevant land for a "bulk storage depot for timber
planks" by a substantial commercial operator.
4.5 In respect of this issue Robert Goff J. (as he then was) held as follows:
"Mr Fay for the local planning authority submitted that in so
approaching the matter, the Secretary of State erred in law. He submitted that
the proper course for the Secretary of State was to compare the existing use
with the last preceding use as it in fact existed in order to decide whether
there had been in fact a material change in the use of the land. Section 94(7)
constituted, he submitted, no bar to such an inquiry because that subsection
provided only that an established use certificate should be conclusive as
respects any matter stated therein, and the certificate in question was wholly
silent as to the scope and intensity of the use at the time it was issued (p.10
A-C)
In my judgment, this criticism of the Secretary of State's approach is not
well founded. The purpose of an established use certificate is clear. It does
not render a use lawful. To that extent it is unlike a grant of planning
permission. Therefore, if, for example, the use specified in an established use
certificate is abandoned, it cannot lawfully be resumed. Its function is to
render the specified use, as long as it persists, immune from an enforcement
notice It, therefore, precludes the necessity of investigating events which may
have occurred many years before as to what was the established use at the date
of the issue of the certificate." if Mr Fays submission were to be correct,
it would deprive an established use certificate of all efficacy. In each
case it would be necessary to investigate the actual use at the date of the
issue of the certificate in under to ascertain whether there had in tact been a
material change of use, a fresh investigation which it was the object of the
established use certification procedure to obviate (p, 1O.C-E)
Nor, in my
judgment, does it assist Mr. Fay to argue that the certificate
specifies no particular level or intensity of activity, and, therefore, to
submit that the level or intensity of activity, and, therefore, to submit that the level or intensity
of activity was not a matter stated in the certificate and so was a matter on
which the certificate was not conclusive. The short answer on this point is that
the use was matter stated in the certificate. Since no limit was placed upon
either part of the site to be so used or the intensity of the use, the use so
specified was without limit as to space within the site or intensity. Mr. Fay
cannot, therefore, now complain that the Secretary of State has erred in law in
holding that there has been no material change of use by reason of the area of
the site now employed or the present intensity of use. (p.10F-G)
But the case has a moral. It demonstrates that planning authorities should
exercise great care concerning thc terms of established use certificates which
they issue. If a certificate is not drawn with care and expressly limited to the
precise use in question, then its issue can lead to the consequence that the
authority may, through its own act, find itself thereafter precluded trom
preventing a use for which planning permission would not have been granted
simply because the certificate had been issued in terms wider than were
necessary. (p.11 C-D)
See also Kilner: Brown J. at page 11 D-F
4.6 It is to be observed that the Broxbourn decision was concerned
with "established use certificates" granted pursuant to s.52 TCPA
1971. There are material differences between certificates granted under that
provision and those granted pursuant to the "new" procedure under ss.
191 - 192 TCPA 1990 in particular a use is "lawful" if certified
pursuant to 1990 Act. Therefore, it is submitted, that the importance identified
by Robert Goff and Kilner Brown JJ. of strictly and precisely identifying the use
or development within a certificate is heightened.
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5.
The error of the law
Intensification may amount to a material change of use for which planning
consent is required (see Brooks and Burton. v. SoSE. [1977] 1 WLR 1294 ).
Whether a material change of use occurs through intensification is a matter of
fact and degree for the local planning authority A decision as to whether
intensification has occurred is to be considered against the planning base-line
situation of the existing lawful use.
5.2 The proposed use described in certificates TH/99/0377and TH/99/0400 have
the effect of certifying as lawful the civilian use of that part of Manston
Airport and its buildings to which each certificate relates without any
limitation as to the number of aircraft movements.
The effect of the certificates as granted would
permit unfettered
intensification in the use of the airport and its buildings beyond the level of
use that had historically existed at the date of the applications. The
description of the proposed use or development set out in the certificates as
granted is sufficiently wide such that there would be no power for the
Respondent to enforce against such future intensification (see Circular 10/97;
Broxbournc case )
5.4 Both the Respondent and the Wiggins Group plc have been asked expressly
whether the description of the proposed use provided in the certificates
TW99/0377 and TIV98/0400 is to be read as imposing any limitation on the level
of air traffic movements. No substantive reply has been forthcoming from either
the Respondent or the Wiggins Group plc (see Witness Statement of Richard Buxton
paras 5-9, exhibits RB/l and RB/2).
5.5 The Respondent local planning authority, when considering the
applications for certificates TH/99/0377 and "IH/98/0400, had before them
information as to the level of military and civilian aircraft movcmcnts at
Manston for the years 1993 - 1997 (exhibit MDB.1 to Mr Brown's witness
statement). However. no information had been provided as to the nature and
extent of the proposed civilian use of the airport by the Wiggins Group (the new
owners). In particular, no infomlation had been provided as to the number of air
traffic movements which were anticipated, the types of aircraft or the hours of
operation.
5.6 The Respondent's Director of Planning Services presented a report to the
Planning Committcc when the applications for certificates TH/99/0377 and TH/98/4000
were considered In this report the Committee were informed that the new owners
of Manston "intend to pursue a programme of expansion of the commercial use
of the former miliary airfield". This intention of Wiggins Group PLC as the
new owners of RAF Manston is borne out by subsequent press reports and the
proposal to, inter alia. replace and regrade passenger aprons, etc at the
airport (see Witness Statement of Richard Buxton paras.9-12, exhibits RB/3-RB/4).
5.7 However, the report fails to inform the Planning Committee:
(a) that intensification or use of the airoort may amount to a material
change of use; and~
(b) that proposed development for which certificates were sought and
subsequently granted permit unfettered intensification of the use of the airport
for civilian purposes; and
(c) that the Respondent was entitled (and advised by DETR guidance) to
consider carefully the potential for intensification of use of the airport
beyond historic leveIs and to consider the imposition of a limitation within the
description of the proposed use to reflect what was considered to he the lawful
level of use.
5.8 In that thc Planning Committee of the Respondent plainly relied upon the
report of the Director of Planning in determining the applications for
certificates TH/99/377 and TW98/400 the Respondent:
a) failed to consider the question of possible intensification: and
b) thereby failed to consider whether to include a limitation to reflect the
lawful level of use of the airport.
6. Relevance of Certificates granted in 1998
6.1 Two certificates of lawful proposed use or development were granted by
the Respondent during 1998. These certificates as referred to at para.5 of the
notice of application.
6.2 Certificate TH/98/O399 was granted on 4 June 1998 and authorised
retention of existing airfield buildings (see exhibit ADB.2 to affirmation of
Mr.Bruce).
6.3 Certificate TW98/9398 was granted on 28 July 1998 and certified as lawful
the "proposed use of the airfield for civilian purposes". The land to
which that certificate related is identified in the Second Schedule to the
certificate as follows:
"Location' RAF Manston, Kent (restricted to the area edged red on plan
attached to this certificate) "
6.4 Certificate TH/98/0398 and the plan attached thereto are included in
exhibit ADB.2 to Mr Bruce's affirmation.
6.5 It is accepted that these certificates were not and are not challenged by
way of Judicial Review and therefore remain lawful.
6.6 Mr. Bruce, in his affirmation suggests that the existence of these
certificates is fatal or of material relevance to Applicants' challenge to the
later certificates (TH/99/0377 and TH/98/0400) (see eg. paras. 41-42).
6.7 Certificate TH/98/O399, which authorises the retention of buildings, is
not material to either the use of those buildings for commercial civilian
purposes nor to the use of the remainder of the Manston.
6.8 Certificate TH/98/0398 relating to the use of the Manston for civilian
purposes relates to a different area of land to certificate TW99/0400 (which is
the subject of the challenge). (Compare plans at ADB.2 (plan attached to
certificate TH/98/0398) with plan at ADB 3 (final page) being the plan to which
certificate TH/99/0377 (under challenge) relates).
6.9 The fact that certificate TH/99/0377 is more extensive that the earlier
certificate is acknowledged in the Director' of Planning's report to the
Planning Committee which considered certificate TH/99/0377 ( para, 1.3 bundle
p.38) and in David Bruce's affirmation (para.31).
6.10 The existence of certificates TH/98/0398 and TH/98/0399 is not therefore
fatal, as a matter of law or discretion, to the challenge brought by the
Applicant to the later certificates.